TLS Works by Name but Fails by IP? Match the Certificate Identity
A monitoring endpoint connects successfully by its DNS name, but the same client rejects a connection made to its numerical IP address. Reaching the same server does not make those two names interchangeable for TLS identity checking.

Key takeaways |
Keep trust, service identity and routing as separate checks. Resolve the documented endpoint name or certificate coverage instead of disabling verification to make a test pass. |
1. Write down the name the client intended to reach
Record the configured endpoint exactly as used, including whether it contains a DNS hostname or an IP literal. Keep the original error and the client version. A screenshot showing only the destination’s address can omit the name against which the client actually performed its identity check.
Use an authorised test environment and sanitised records. Certificate files can be public, but private keys, passwords, tokens and operational payloads are unnecessary for a routine identity enquiry and must not be copied into support screenshots.
For application scoping, start with the ProSight Software platform overview. Confirm the actual supported interface and acceptance requirements; the generic protocol explanation does not establish product compatibility.
2. Match the appropriate certificate identifier
RFC 9525 distinguishes DNS reference identities from IP reference identities. For an IP reference, the value must exactly match an iPAddress entry in subjectAltName. Resolving a DNS name to an address does not by itself make a DNS certificate entry an IP identity match.
A hypothetical service is intended to be reached through telemetry.example. Its certificate contains that DNS identity, but no corresponding IP identity. Replacing the configured hostname with a numerical address changes the identity requirement. This example explains the boundary and does not identify a real ProSight Software endpoint.
Do not infer coverage from a familiar organisation name on a certificate or from a successful socket connection. The service identity check concerns the configured reference identity and applicable certificate entries. Different client libraries may produce different error wording for the same mismatch.

3. Separate routing from verification
Confirm that the intended DNS name resolves through the approved network path and that the client reaches the expected service. An incorrect DNS record, proxy or destination can create an identity error even when the application configuration was originally correct.
Then distinguish identity mismatch from an untrusted issuer, expired validity or another TLS validation failure. Solving one category does not automatically solve the others. Keep each observation and the responsible owner visible rather than reducing everything to an unexplained connection failure.
Do not bypass an error by turning off certificate or hostname validation. That removes the evidence the acceptance test was meant to establish. Arrange the correct documented endpoint configuration or certificate provisioning with the authorised service and security owners.
4. Retest through the actual deployment path
Use the same supported client, proxy path and endpoint representation that will be used operationally. A successful browser visit on a technician’s laptop does not establish that an embedded gateway has the same trust material, name resolution or configuration.
Retain the endpoint reference, certificate identity evidence, relevant client error and the final successful validation result. Record configuration changes and ownership so a later address change does not silently replace the supported hostname with an IP shortcut.
Test a deliberately mismatched identity in an isolated fixture where appropriate to confirm that rejection remains effective. A positive test alone can conceal a client configuration that is accepting every certificate. Keep test credentials separate from production and avoid control commands.
Before handover, confirm that the intended application request also succeeds and carries the expected data. TLS acceptance establishes a protected service connection; it does not prove acquisition freshness, correct measurement mapping or availability of an unverified ProSight Software integration.
5. Diagnostic checks
Observation | Check next |
DNS name works; IP fails | Check IP subjectAltName coverage. |
Identity matches; trust fails | Investigate trust and other validation results. |
One client works; gateway fails | Compare actual supported client configuration. |
TLS succeeds; data is old | Check acquisition and application behaviour. |
6. Recommended equipment / related solutions
ProSight Software integration project enquiries suit a discussion of the supported connection, test evidence and project scope. Confirm availability of the required interface for the actual deployment.
Related guide: handle HTTP 204 no-content success. Keep response handling separate from the transport or identity check discussed here.
Next step: discuss your integration project. Provide exact equipment, firmware, the documented interface and sanitised test evidence.
7. Practical questions
Does matching the server’s IP prove its identity?
No. Routing and certificate identity are separate checks.
Should I disable verification temporarily?
Keep verification enabled and resolve the actual identity or trust requirement in an approved test setup.
Primary reference: the official protocol specification. Use the relevant sections and exact product documentation when implementing the checks.
Need help with your application?
Email: sales@prosense.com.au
Email: info@prosightsoftware.com
Phone: 1800 560 854

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